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"Suffolk Banking System against the Crisis of 1837 - 39 --the Spontaneous Development of "Lender of Last resort" by a commercial bank--" (in Japanese)

Listed author(s):
  • Takuma Omori

    (Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo)

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    In this paper, it is discussed about the point how the Suffolk Banking System could defend against the instability of financial order in New England extending 1837 ]39 Crisis. And is discussed about the point, that is, performing the System, the Suffolk Bank regionally and spontaneously tried to perform the role of quasi-Central Banking, especially the function of "Moral Persuasion" and " lender of last resort", backing for the confidence by state-governmental authorities. "Spontaneousness" in the System is so unique because it is presented the historical evidence both support and criticism in Free Banking Theory. In this analysis, it is proved "Spontaneousness" is not the supporting evidence but the criticizing evidence in F.B.T. as the regional Central Banking making trial movement against the instability of financial order.

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    Paper provided by CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo in its series CIRJE J-Series with number CIRJE-J-79.

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    Length: 28 pages
    Date of creation: Jun 2002
    Handle: RePEc:tky:jseres:2002cj79
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