What Determines the Implementation of IMF Programs?
For many years analysis of IMF conditionality overlooked the extent to which it was implemented. However, more recently increasing attention has been paid to implementation. Theoretical contributions have focused on the importance of special interest groups, but empirical evidence has failed to provide compelling support for the theory. Indeed, empirical studies have reported mixed results that sometimes seem to be conflicting. This paper identifies a range of economic, political and institutional factors that may, in principle, influence implementation. Using various measures of implementation, it then tests an econometric model designed to capture these influences over 1992-2004 exploiting improved sources of data. The results suggest that significant determinants of implementation are trade openness, the existence of veto players and the amount of resources committed by the Fund. The paper offers an interpretation of the results and discusses the implications for policy.
|Date of creation:||Sep 2006|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Forthcoming in World Development|
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