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Passing on Success? Productivity Outcomes for Quarterbacks Chosen in the 1999-2004 National Football League Player Entry Drafts


  • Kevin G. Quinn

    (St. Nobert College)

  • Melissa Geier

    (St. Nobert College)

  • Anne Berkovitz

    (St. Nobert College)


Seventy quarterbacks were selected during six NFL drafts held 1999-2004. This paper analyzes information available prior to the draft (college, college passing statistics, NFL Combine data) and draft outcomes (overall number picked and signing bonus). Also analyzed for these players are measures of NFL playing opportunity (games played, games started, pass attempts) and measures of productivity (Pro Bowls made, passer rating, DVOA, and DPAR) for up to the first seven years of each drafted player’s NFL career. We find that more highly-drafted QBs get significantly more opportunity to play in the NFL. However, we find no evidence that more highly-drafted QBs become more productive passers than lower-drafted QBs that see substantial playing time. Furthermore, QBs with more pass attempts in their final year of more highly-ranked college programs exhibit lower NFL passing productivity.

Suggested Citation

  • Kevin G. Quinn & Melissa Geier & Anne Berkovitz, 2007. "Passing on Success? Productivity Outcomes for Quarterbacks Chosen in the 1999-2004 National Football League Player Entry Drafts," Working Papers 0711, International Association of Sports Economists;North American Association of Sports Economists.
  • Handle: RePEc:spe:wpaper:0711

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    File Function: Paper presented at the 2007 IASE Conference in Dayton, Ohio
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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Krautmann, Anthony C, 1999. "What's Wrong with Scully-Estimates of a Player's Marginal Revenue Product," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 37(2), pages 369-381, April.
    2. Craig Depken, 1999. "Free-Agency and the Competitiveness of Major League Baseball," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 14(3), pages 205-217, May.
    3. Scully, Gerald W, 1974. "Pay and Performance in Major League Baseball," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(6), pages 915-930, December.
    4. Simon Rottenberg, 1956. "The Baseball Players' Labor Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64, pages 242-242.
    5. James R. Chelius & James B. Dworkin, 1980. "An Economic Analysis of Final-Offer Arbitration as a Conflict Resolution Device," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 24(2), pages 293-310, June.
    6. Donald Cymrot & James Dunlevy & William Even, 2001. "'Who's on first': an empirical test of the Coase Theorem in baseball," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 33(5), pages 593-603.
    7. Joel G. Maxcy, 2002. "Rethinking Restrictions On Player Mobility In Major League Baseball," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 20(2), pages 145-159, April.
    8. Eckard, E Woodrow, 2001. "Free Agency, Competitive Balance, and Diminishing Returns to Pennant Contention," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 39(3), pages 430-443, July.
    9. Paul M. Sommers & Noel Quinton, 1982. "Pay and Performance in Major League Baseball: The Case of the First Family of Free Agents," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 17(3), pages 426-436.
    10. Craig A. Depken II, 2002. "Free Agency and the Concentration of Player Talent in Major League Baseball," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 3(4), pages 335-353, November.
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    More about this item


    Sports; NFL; Draft; Quarterback; Productivity;

    JEL classification:

    • L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism
    • J23 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Demand
    • J42 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Monopsony; Segmented Labor Markets


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