Democracy and Volatility: Do Special-Interest Groups Matter?
This paper empirically explores the relationship between special-interest groups and volatility, with focus on the interplay between groups and democracy and on the impact of groups on policy volatility. We find that countries with more interest groups are characterized by less policy volatility; that the number of interest groups has a direct impact on growth volatility, in addition to an indirect impact through policy volatility; and that interest groups appear to be a channel through which democracy impacts both policy volatility and growth volatility.
|Date of creation:||Aug 2008|
|Date of revision:||Aug 2009|
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