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A note on separability and intra-household resource allocation in a collective household model

Author

Listed:
  • Tomoki Fujii

    (School of Economics, Singapore Management Unversity)

  • Ryuichiro Ishikawa

    (University of Tsukuba)

Abstract

We consider a collective model of a household in which earn member has a utility function satisfying the weak separability condition. We show that the separability at the individual level carries over to the household level and that the allocation of private goods in any Pareto-efficient allocation can be supported as a Pareto-efficient allocation of the private sub-problem. We also provide the necessary and sufficient condition for the Pareto weight for the private sub-problem to move in the same direction as the household Pareto weight.

Suggested Citation

  • Tomoki Fujii & Ryuichiro Ishikawa, 2012. "A note on separability and intra-household resource allocation in a collective household model," Working Papers 06-2012, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:siu:wpaper:06-2012
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    Cited by:

    1. Swallow, Kimberly A. & Swallow, Brent M., 2015. "Explicitly integrating institutions into bioeconomic modeling," IFPRI discussion papers 1420, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    2. Donni, Olivier & Molina, José Alberto, 2018. "Household Collective Models: Three Decades of Theoretical Contributions and Empirical Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 11915, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    3. Mizuki Komura, 2013. "Tax reform and endogenous gender bargaining power," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 175-192, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory

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