Do Two Wrongs Make a Right? Export Incentives and Bias in Trade Policy
Two exceptions to the argument that export promotion offsets import substitution are provided. The first is based on the observation that protection in small open economies produces monopolisation of the domestic market. The second qualification stems from the discretionary and contingent nature of the administration of many export incentive schemes.
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|Date of creation:||1996|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University, 8888 University Drive, Burnaby, BC, V5A 1S6, Canada|
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