A Note on Free Entry under Uncertainty: on the Role of Asymmetric Information
In a model of competing managerial .rms I show that the equilibrium number of firms decreases with uncertainty if entry is relatively more costly than monitoring. The result adds to the earlier theoretical contributions and is consistent with the available evidence.
|Date of creation:||24 Apr 2010|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Economics Letters, Vol. 111, 256-259.|
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