Bargaining and the theory of cooperative games: John Nash and beyond
This essay surveys the literature on the axiomatic model of bargaining formulated by Nash ("The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica 28, 1950, 155-162).
|Date of creation:||Sep 2009|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: University of Rochester, Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, Harkness 231 Rochester, New York 14627 U.S.A.|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Anbarci, Nejat, 1991. "The Nash solution and relevant expansions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 137-140, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:roc:rocher:554. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Richard DiSalvo)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.