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Adverse Selection, Credit, and Efficiency: the Case of the Missing Market

Author

Listed:
  • Alberto Martin

    (CREI and Universitat Pompeu Fabra)

Abstract

security market. When they apply to bank loans, though, only entrepreneurs with good projects pledge these additional funds as collateral. This equilibrium thus simultaneously entails cross-subsidization and separation between different types of entrepreneurs.

Suggested Citation

  • Alberto Martin, 2009. "Adverse Selection, Credit, and Efficiency: the Case of the Missing Market," 2009 Meeting Papers 178, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    • Handle: RePEc:red:sed009:178
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    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Anastasios Dosis, 2016. "Investment, Adverse Selection and Optimal Redistributive Taxation," Working Papers hal-01285163, HAL.
    3. David Nickerson, 2016. "Asset Price Volatility, Credit Rationing and Rational Lending Discrimination," International Journal of Economics and Finance, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 8(10), pages 140-158, October.
    4. Dosis, Anastasios, 2019. "The effects of redistributive taxation in credit markets with adverse selection," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
    5. Dosis, Anastasios, 2016. "Investment, Adverse Selection and Optimal Redistributive Taxation," ESSEC Working Papers WP1605, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
    6. Anastasios Dosis, 2019. "Optimal Redistributive Taxation in Credit Markets with Adverse Selection," Working Papers hal-02130458, HAL.
    7. David Nickerson, 2022. "Credit Risk, Regulatory Costs and Lending Discrimination in Efficient Residential Mortgage Markets," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 15(5), pages 1-17, April.
    8. Gormley, Todd A., 2014. "Costly information, entry, and credit access," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 633-667.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities

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