IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/red/sed008/309.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Ramsey Asset Taxation under Asymmetric Information

Author

Listed:
  • University of Venice
  • Nicola Pavoni
  • Piero Gottardi

Abstract

3.Finally we consider the case where the government's information is even more limited, as not only the linear taxes on trades but also the lump-sum tax cannot depend on the ex-post realization of the individual income shocks. In this case the second best cannot typically be attained, but we show that still some partial insurance and some effort level (higher than the minimum) can be sustained, unlike what happens at the competitive equilibrium with no taxes or with only taxes and no trades in he market. Thus the interaction between markets and government intervention proves to be beneficial and enhances the efficiency properties of allocations. Also, at the optimum there may be nonzero trade in assets and in that case the expected tax rate is positive.

Suggested Citation

  • University of Venice & Nicola Pavoni & Piero Gottardi, 2008. "Ramsey Asset Taxation under Asymmetric Information," 2008 Meeting Papers 309, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    • Handle: RePEc:red:sed008:309
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ábrahám, Árpád & Koehne, Sebastian & Pavoni, Nicola, 2011. "On the first-order approach in principal-agent models with hidden borrowing and lending," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(4), pages 1331-1361, July.
    2. Giuseppe Bertola & Winfried Koeniger, 2015. "Hidden insurance in a moral-hazard economy," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(4), pages 777-790, October.
    3. Sebastian Koehne & Nicola Pavoni & Arpad Abraham, 2011. "Optimal Income Taxation with Asset Accumulation," 2011 Meeting Papers 1161, Society for Economic Dynamics.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:red:sed008:309. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Christian Zimmermann (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/sedddea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.