Multitask moral hazard, incentive contracts and land value
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KeywordsMORAL HAZARD; INCENTIVE CONTRACTS; LAND VALUE; SOIL CONSERVATION; SHARECROPPING ; THEORIE DES CONTRATS; METAYAGE; FERTILITE DU SOL; REFORME DES STRUCTURES; TAXE; PROGRES TECHNIQUE; DEVELOPPEMENT AGRICOLE;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- O13 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
- Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment
- Q24 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Land
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGR-2001-10-29 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-2001-10-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-EEC-2001-10-22 (European Economics)
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