IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ptu/wpaper/w199903.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Optimal Executive Compensation: Bonus, Golden Parachutes, Stock Ownership and Stock Options

Author

Listed:
  • Chongwoo Choe

Abstract

This paper studies optimal managerial contracts applying both complete and incomplete contracting approaches. In a complete contracting environment where contracts can be based on earnings, an optimal contract is interpreted as a combination of base salary, golden parachute and bonus. When earnings are not veri able, two types of optimal contracts are derived: a contract with restricted stock ownership, and a contract with stock options. These three types of optimal contracts are payoff-equivalent in a strong sense: agents' ex ante and ex post payoffs are the same under all three contracts. This suggests that the choice of contractual form is irrelevant in the environment studied in this paper. Comparative static analyses of optimal contracts generate several testable hypotheses.

Suggested Citation

  • Chongwoo Choe, 1999. "Optimal Executive Compensation: Bonus, Golden Parachutes, Stock Ownership and Stock Options," Working Papers w199903, Banco de Portugal, Economics and Research Department.
  • Handle: RePEc:ptu:wpaper:w199903
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.bportugal.pt/sites/default/files/anexos/papers/wp199903.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ptu:wpaper:w199903. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (DEE-NTD). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/bdpgvpt.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.