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Divided over Iraq, United over Iran. A Rational Choice Explanation to European Irrationalities

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  • Goldthau, Andreas

Abstract

The War on Iraq in has split the continent into ‘Old Europe’ and ‘New Europe’. On Iran, by contrast, the EU jointly acts in the context of a coordinated European foreign policy. The paper argues that both conflicts resemble an assurance game among the Europeans, in which the entailed trust dilemma prevented involved players from cooperating. It identifies the European ‘Dialogues’ with Iran as a regime that reduced information deficits in the case of Iran. In the case of Iraq, however, European players were unable to mutually judge whether there was a hidden agenda or not – and thus opted for defection instead of cooperation.

Suggested Citation

  • Goldthau, Andreas, 2008. "Divided over Iraq, United over Iran. A Rational Choice Explanation to European Irrationalities," MPRA Paper 7813, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:7813
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    Keywords

    European foreign policy; nuclear conflict; WMD; Iran; Iraq; assurance game; regime theory;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F59 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - Other
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions

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