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Top management’s snooping: Is sneaking over employees’ productivity and job commitment a wise approach?


  • Hasan, Syed Akif
  • Subhani, Muhammad Imtiaz


The management’s responsibility is to monitor the employee’s performance but when it becomes a desire of the management to snoop/spy the employees’ performance then this act has a direct influence on the employees and their motivations. The paper investigates the effects of top management’s spying/snooping in the organization on employees’ productivity and job commitment. For the purpose a sample of 3500 employees via self-administered survey technique were analyzed. Tobit Model (Censored regression) has been used to interrogate the effect of snooping/ spying on employee productivity and commitment. Tobit Model marked findings that the approach of top management to snoop/spy on the employees’ productivity and job commitment affects adversely on the employees. Policy makers should adopt informal ways to practice snooping as it causes stress, mental illness, de-motivation and especially when snooping is via other co-workers and employees, it creates major disruption and a rise to politicking in organization, which effect the proper streamlining of business operations across the departments.

Suggested Citation

  • Hasan, Syed Akif & Subhani, Muhammad Imtiaz, 2012. "Top management’s snooping: Is sneaking over employees’ productivity and job commitment a wise approach?," MPRA Paper 35691, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:35691

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    More about this item


    Organizational spying/snooping; job commitment; employees’ productivity; stress;

    JEL classification:

    • O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation

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