IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/3301.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Information : Price And Impact On General Welfare And Optimal Investment. An Anticipative Stochastic Differential Game Model

Author

Listed:
  • Ewald, Christian-Oliver
  • Xiao, Yajun

Abstract

We consider a continuous time market model, in which agents influence asset prices. The agents are assumed to be rational and maximizing expected utility from terminal wealth. They share the same utility function but are allowed to possess different levels of information. Technically our model represents a stochastic differential game with anticipative strategy sets. We derive necessary and sufficient criteria for the existence of Nash-equilibria and characterize them for various levels of information asymmetry. Furthermore we study in how far the asymmetry in the level of information influences Nash-equilibria and general welfare. We show that under certain conditions in a competitive environment an increased level of information may in fact lower the level of general welfare. This effect can not be observed in representative agent based models, where information always increases welfare. Finally we extend our model in a way, that we add prior stages, in which agents are allowed to buy and sell information from each other, before engaging in trading with the market assets. We determine equilibrium prices for particular pieces of information in this setup.

Suggested Citation

  • Ewald, Christian-Oliver & Xiao, Yajun, 2007. "Information : Price And Impact On General Welfare And Optimal Investment. An Anticipative Stochastic Differential Game Model," MPRA Paper 3301, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:3301
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3301/1/MPRA_paper_3301.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Peter Imkeller, 2003. "Malliavin's Calculus in Insider Models: Additional Utility and Free Lunches," Mathematical Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(1), pages 153-169.
    2. repec:wsi:ijtafx:v:08:y:2005:i:03:n:s0219024905003025 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Bernt Øksendal, 2006. "A Universal Optimal Consumption Rate For An Insider," Mathematical Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(1), pages 119-129.
    4. Arturo Kohatsu-Higa & Agnès Sulem, 2006. "Utility Maximization In An Insider Influenced Market," Mathematical Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(1), pages 153-179.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    information; financial markets; stochastic differential games;

    JEL classification:

    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:3301. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joachim Winter) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.