Illegal to punish or punish the illegals: Which way should Ukraine and Moldova choose?
A government seeks to minimise the maximum expected utility of migrants and smugglers, but has to do this under constraints. It is argued that a vote maximising government should choose policies based on the relative weight of the introduced lobby utility function, which acts as a constraint. The model allows for calculation of simplified but optimal punishments, however this would require information about country-specific parameters. The model setting assumes that there is almost perfect competition between the facilitators (people smugglers).
|Date of creation:||01 Jun 2008|
|Publication status:||Published in Revista Sciintifica “Studii Economice" 1-2 (2008): pp. 87-97|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany|
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
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- Vayrynen, Raimo, 2003. "Illegal Immigration, Human Trafficking, and Organized Crime," WIDER Working Paper Series 072, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
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