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A non-cooperative Pareto-efficient solution to a single-shot Prisoner's Dilemma

Author

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  • Wu, Haoyang

Abstract

The Prisoner's Dilemma is a simple model that captures the essential contradiction between individual rationality and global rationality. Although the single-shot Prisoner's Dilemma is usually viewed simple, in this paper we will propose an algorithmic model and a non-binding scheme to help non-cooperative agents obtain Pareto-efficient payoffs self-enforcingly. The scheme stems from quantum game theory, but is applicable to the macro world immediately.

Suggested Citation

  • Wu, Haoyang, 2011. "A non-cooperative Pareto-efficient solution to a single-shot Prisoner's Dilemma," MPRA Paper 30070, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:30070
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Quantum game theory; Prisoner's Dilemma;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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