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A theory of the allocation of political time


  • canegrati, emanuele


In this paper I will introduce a microfounded model of political ac- tivities. The aim is twofold: �rst of all, �lling an existing gap with the actual literature which still lacks of a theoretical explanation about how voters choose their leisure acitivities in particular those related with Politics; secondly, explaining why the old may have an interest to spend a greater amount of their leisure in political activities than the young. Empirical evidence taken by the British Election Suvery, con- �rm the hipothesis: political acitivism is related to age (although other individual characteristics, such as gender and education contribute to increase the explanatory power of regressions) and the old follow di¤er- ent activities in order to lobby politicians. Finally the paper represents an empirical proof for the Single Mindedness Theory of Social Secu- rity Systems, which states that since the old have a natural preference for leisure, they have to �nd a �nancial coverage for the reduction in labour income due to their decision to early retire or to reduce their labour supply.

Suggested Citation

  • canegrati, emanuele, 2007. "A theory of the allocation of political time," MPRA Paper 1647, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:1647

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. canegrati, emanuele, 2006. "The Single-Mindedness Theory: Micro-foundation and Applications to Social Security Systems," MPRA Paper 1223, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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    Cited by:

    1. Canegrati, Emanuele, 2007. "On redistribution effects of public debt amongst single-minded generations," MPRA Paper 2254, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J2 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D0 - Microeconomics - - General

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