Fiscal Regimes and Wage Formation: Learning Distributive Conflict in a Kaleckian Economy

This paper develops a Kaleckian model of wage dynamics in which wages are determined by forward-looking expectations, firms’ profitability, and institutional conditions shaped by fiscal policy. The model introduces nonlinear and regime-dependent effects through an institutional function that mediates the transmission of expectations and profits into wage outcomes. To empirically assess these mechanisms, we estimate a flexible reduced-form specification using machine learning methods, allowing for complex interactions and threshold effects that are not captured by standard linear approaches. The results provide evidence that institutional and fiscal regimes play a key role in shaping wage responses, supporting the view that income distribution is driven by distributive conflict and policy structures rather than market-clearing forces. These findings contribute to the post-Keynesian literature by offering a novel empirical framework for analyzing wage formation and highlight the importance of fiscal policy in influencing inequality and macroeconomic stability.