Ideology and Existence of 50%-Majority Equilibria in Multidimensional Spatial Voting Models
When aggregating individual preferences through the majority rule in an n-dimensional spatial voting model, the â€˜worst-caseâ€™ scenario is a social choice configuration where no political equilibrium exists unless a super-majority rate as high as 1 â€” 1/(n+1) is adopted. In this paper we assume that a lower d-dimensional (d
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