IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pen/papers/21-005.html

Learning with Heterogeneous Misspecfied Models: Characterization and Robustness

Author

Listed:
  • J. Aislinn Bohren

    (University of Pennsylvania)

  • Daniel N. Hauser

    (Aalto University and Helsinki GSE)

Abstract

This paper develops a general framework to study how misinterpreting information impacts learning. Our main result is a simple criterion to characterize long-run beliefs based on the underlying form of misspeci?cation. We present this characterization in the context of social learning, then highlight how it applies to other learning environ-ments, including individual learning. A key contribution is that our characterization applies to settings with model heterogeneity and provides conditions for entrenched disagreement. Our characterization can be used to determine whether a representative agent approach is valid in the face of heterogeneity, study how di?ering levels of bias or unawareness of others’ biases impact learning, and explore whether the impact of a bias is sensitive to parametric speci?cation or the source of information. This uni?ed framework synthesizes insights gleaned from previously studied forms of misspeci?ca-tion and provides novel insights in speci?c applications, as we demonstrate in settings with partisan bias, overreaction, naive learning, and level-k reasoning.

Suggested Citation

  • J. Aislinn Bohren & Daniel N. Hauser, 2021. "Learning with Heterogeneous Misspecfied Models: Characterization and Robustness," PIER Working Paper Archive 21-005, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  • Handle: RePEc:pen:papers:21-005
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://economics.sas.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/filevault/21-005.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pen:papers:21-005. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Administrator (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/deupaus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.