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Medicare Auction Reform

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Abstract

Controlling Medicare costs is essential to our health care system. Yet as we look to the future, unfunded Medicare expenses are estimated to be about 70 trillion dollars—an unsustainable amount. Effective use of market methods in Medicare is our best hope for controlling these costs while maintaining quality. Unfortunately, the current Medicare auction program is fatally flawed. This 12-minute video summarizes the problems and the solution. Experts from government and industry voice their concerns and propose a path forward.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Cramton, 2012. "Medicare Auction Reform," Papers of Peter Cramton 11marv, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2012.
    • Handle: RePEc:pcc:pccumd:11marv
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    File URL: https://vimeo.com/26486255
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    1. Cramton Peter & Katzman Brett E, 2010. "Reducing Healthcare Costs Requires Good Market Design," The Economists' Voice, De Gruyter, vol. 7(4), pages 1-4, October.
    2. Brett Katzman & Kerry Anne McGeary, 2008. "Will Competitive Bidding Decrease Medicare Prices," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 74(3), pages 839-856, January.
    3. Peter Cramton, 2012. "The Hidden Costs of a Flawed Medicare Auction," Papers of Peter Cramton 12chcfma, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2012.
    4. Peter Cramton & Sean Ellermeyer & Brett Katzman, 2015. "Designed To Fail: The Medicare Auction For Durable Medical Equipment," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 53(1), pages 469-485, January.
    5. Dimitri,Nicola & Piga,Gustavo & Spagnolo,Giancarlo (ed.), 2006. "Handbook of Procurement," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521870733.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Medicare auctions; health care auctions; procurement auctions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

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