Note on a Two-Player All-pay Auction with Asymmetrical Bidders and Incomplete Information
The present paper analyzes a general class of first-price all-pay auctions where two players have different "bidding technologies" and one bidder has a head start advantage over his/her opponent. Equilibria are characterized for the complete information setting and for the case where there is incomplete asymmetrical information. In particular, the handicapped player is uncertain about the size of the opponent’s advantage.
|Date of creation:||2010|
|Date of revision:|
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