Cooperation in Multiple Spheres of Interaction
This note introduces transferable utility cooperative games with multiple membership, extending the scope of cooperative game theory to economic environments featuring externalities and membership in multiple coalitions. This wider class of games generalises games in characteristic and partition function form. definitions of the core for this class of games are proposed, under which cooperation is facilitated through the cross-cutting of contractual arrangements with multiple membership.
|Date of creation:||01 May 2008|
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