Optimal Stalling While Bargaining
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- Caroline Freund & Mary Hallward-Driemeier & Bob Rijkers, 2016.
"Deals and Delays: Firm-level Evidence on Corruption and Policy Implementation Times,"
World Bank Economic Review,
World Bank Group, vol. 30(2), pages 354-382.
- Freund, Caroline & Hallward-Driemeier, Mary & Rijkers, Bob, 2014. "Deals and delays : firm-level evidence on corruption and policy implementation times," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6949, The World Bank.
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KeywordsBargaining; Delay; Optimal Stalling; Learning; Uncommon Priors;
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
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