The Superiority of Biased Reviewers in a Model of Simultaneous Sales
This paper considers the impact of reviewers on sales of products of quality unknown to consumers. Sales occur simultaneously after consideration by a reviewer with a known level of bias. Consumers observe the reviewer`s decision and a private signal. We find that: (a) with flexible prices and signals that are not too revealing the reviewer most biased against the product is best for profits; (b) with flexible prices and very revealing private signals the reviewer most biased in favour is optimal; (c) with fixed prices then a reviewer biased against, but close to unibased, is optimal.
|Date of creation:||01 Sep 2004|
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