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You Are Not in My Boat: Common Fate and Similarity Attractors in Bargaining Settings

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  • Daniel John Zizzo

Abstract

Sharing a common fate with some people but not others may affect how economic agents behave within firms and organizations. Recognizing that many bilateral transactions occur both within and between groups sharing some degree of common fate, we present an experimental test of the effect of common fate in bargaining settings. Virtually all subjects differentiating between insiders and outsiders discriminate against outsiders. Within-group cooperation was not increased, but between-group conflict was. We also test, and find support for, theories of similarity-based decision-making. We develop and use a generally applicable technique to understand framing effects, based on identifying similarity attractors.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel John Zizzo, 2003. "You Are Not in My Boat: Common Fate and Similarity Attractors in Bargaining Settings," Economics Series Working Papers 167, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:167
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    File URL: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:2bd42e81-af82-439d-a595-72d810a5f3f3
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Tan, Jonathan H.W. & Zizzo, Daniel John, 2008. "Groups, cooperation and conflict in games," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 1-17, February.
    2. Kei Tsutsui & Daniel Zizzo, 2014. "Group status, minorities and trust," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 17(2), pages 215-244, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    bargaining; common fate; similarity; framing effects;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • C81 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - Methodology for Collecting, Estimating, and Organizing Microeconomic Data; Data Access
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

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