A Mechanism for Inducing Cooperation in Non-Cooperative Environments: Theory and Applications
We construct a market based mechanism that induces players in a non-cooperative game to make the same choices as characterize cooperation. We then argue that this mechanism is applicable to a wide range of economic questions and illustrate this claim using the problems of "The Tragedy of the Commons" and "R&D Spillovers in Duopoly".
|Date of creation:||01 Feb 2000|
|Date of revision:||01 Feb 2000|
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