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Infinite-Horizon Mechanism Design

Author

Listed:
  • Alessandro Pavan
  • Ilya Segal
  • Juuso Toikka

Abstract

These notes examine the problem of how to extend envelope theorems to infinite-horizon dynamic mechanism design settings, with an application to the design of "bandit auctions."

Suggested Citation

  • Alessandro Pavan & Ilya Segal & Juuso Toikka, 2010. "Infinite-Horizon Mechanism Design," Discussion Papers 1503, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  • Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1503
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    File URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1503.pdf
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    Keywords

    asymmetric information; stochastic processes; incentives; mechanism design JEL Classification Numbers: D82; C73; L1.;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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