Does Information Break the Political Resource Curse? Experimental Evidence from Mozambique
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Other versions of this item:
- Alex Armand & Alexander Coutts & Pedro C. Vicente & Ines Vilela, 2019. "Does Information Break the Political Resource Curse? Experimental Evidence from Mozambique," IFS Working Papers W19/01, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Alex Armand & Alexander Coutts & Pedro C. Vicente & Inês Vilela, 2019. "Does information break the political resource curse? Experimental evidence from Mozambique," NOVAFRICA Working Paper Series wp1902, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia, NOVAFRICA.
References listed on IDEAS
- Halvor Mehlum & Karl Moene & Ragnar Torvik, 2006.
"Institutions and the Resource Curse,"
Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(508), pages 1-20, January.
- Halvor Mehlum & Karl Moene & Ragnar Torvik, 2002. "Institutions and the resource curse," GE, Growth, Math methods 0210004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Mehlum, Halvor & Moene, Karl-Ove & Torvik, Ragnar, 2003. "Institutions and the resource curse," Memorandum 29/2002, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Halvor Mehlum & Karl Moene & Ragnar Torvik, 2002. "Institutions and the resource curse," Development and Comp Systems 0210003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Halvor Mehlum & Karl Moene & Ragnar Torvik, 2004. "Institutions and the Resource Curse," DEGIT Conference Papers c009_012, DEGIT, Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade.
More about this item
KeywordsNatural Resources; Curse; Natural Gas; Information; Deliberation; Rent-seeking; Mozambique.;
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- O13 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
- O55 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Africa
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-CDM-2019-01-21 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-ENE-2019-01-21 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2019-01-21 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-POL-2019-01-21 (Positive Political Economics)
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