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Tunneling and Hidden Profits in Health Care

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Listed:
  • Ashvin Gandhi
  • Andrew Olenski

Abstract

This study examines “tunneling” practices through which health care providers covertly extract profit by making inflated payments for goods and services to commonly-owned related parties. While incentives to tunnel exist across sectors, health care providers may find it uniquely advantageous to do so. Masking profits as costs, thereby obscuring true profitability, may dissuade regulators from imposing stricter quality standards and encourage public payers to increase reimbursement rates. Likewise, tunneling effectively “shields” assets from malpractice liability risk, by moving them off the firm’s balance sheet. Using uniquely detailed financial data on the nursing home industry, we apply a difference-in-differences approach to study how firms’ stated costs change when they start transacting with a related party, allowing us to infer by how much these payments are inflated. We find evidence of widespread tunneling through inflated rents and management fees paid to related parties. Extrapolating these markups to all firms’ related party transactions, our estimates suggest that in 2019, 63% of nursing home profits were hidden and tunneled to related parties through inflated transfer prices.

Suggested Citation

  • Ashvin Gandhi & Andrew Olenski, 2024. "Tunneling and Hidden Profits in Health Care," NBER Working Papers 32258, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:32258
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • I10 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - General
    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures

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