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Adverse Selection Dynamics in Privately-Produced Safe Debt Markets

Author

Listed:
  • Nathan Foley-Fisher
  • Gary B. Gorton
  • Stéphane Verani

Abstract

Privately-produced safe debt is designed so that there is no adverse selection in trade. This is because no agent finds it profitable to produce private information about the debt’s backing and all agents know this (i.e., it is information-insensitive). But in some macro states, it becomes profitable for some agents to produce private information, and then the debt faces adverse selection when traded (i.e., it becomes information-sensitive). We empirically study these adverse selection dynamics in a very important asset class, collateralized loan obligations, a large symbiotic appendage of the regulated banking system, which finances loans to below investment-grade firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Nathan Foley-Fisher & Gary B. Gorton & Stéphane Verani, 2020. "Adverse Selection Dynamics in Privately-Produced Safe Debt Markets," NBER Working Papers 28016, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:28016
    Note: AP CF EFG ME
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    Cited by:

    1. Mahyar Kargar & Benjamin Lester & David Lindsay & Shuo Liu & Pierre-Olivier Weill & Diego Zúñiga, 2021. "Corporate Bond Liquidity during the COVID-19 Crisis [The day coronavirus nearly broke the financial markets]," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 34(11), pages 5352-5401.
    2. Iorgova, Silvia & Ross, Chase P., 2023. "Investor information and bank instability during the European debt crisis," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    3. Jin-Wook Chang & Matt Darst, 2022. "Moldy Lemons and Market Shutdowns," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2022-013, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors

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