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A Theory of Equality Before the Law

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  • Daron Acemoglu
  • Alexander Wolitzky

Abstract

We propose a model of the emergence of equality before the law. A society can support “effort” (“cooperation”, “pro-social behavior”) using the “carrot” of future cooperation or the “stick” of coercive punishment. Community enforcement relies only on the carrot and involves low coercion, low inequality, and low effort. A society in which the elite control the means of violence supplements the carrot with the stick, and involves high coercion, high inequality, and high effort. In this regime, elites are privileged: they are not subject to the same coercive punishments as non-elites. We show that it may be optimal—even from the viewpoint of the elite—to establish equality before the law, where all agents are subject to the same coercive punishments. The central mechanism is that equality before the law increases elites’ effort, which in turn encourages even higher effort from non-elites. Equality before the law combines high coercion and low inequality—in our baseline model, elites exert the same level of effort as non-elites. Factors that make the emergence of equality before the law more likely include limits on the extent of coercion, greater marginal returns to effort, increases in the size of the elite group, greater political power for non-elites, and under some additional conditions, lower economic inequality.

Suggested Citation

  • Daron Acemoglu & Alexander Wolitzky, 2018. "A Theory of Equality Before the Law," NBER Working Papers 24681, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:24681
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    Cited by:

    1. Kenju Kamei & Smriti Sharma & Matthew J. Walker, 2023. "Collective Sanction Enforcement: New Experimental Evidence from Two Societies," Keio-IES Discussion Paper Series 2023-014, Institute for Economics Studies, Keio University.
    2. Kehinde Hassan Babalola & Simon Hull & Jennifer Whittal, 2023. "Assessing Peri-Urban Land Management Using 8Rs Framework of Responsible Land Management: The Case of Peri-Urban Land in Ekiti State, Nigeria," Land, MDPI, vol. 12(9), pages 1-22, September.
    3. Liu, Ce & Ali, S. Nageeb, 2019. "Conventions and Coalitions in Repeated Games," Working Papers 2019-8, Michigan State University, Department of Economics.
    4. Hery Zaenal Kurniawan & Made Warka & Slamet Suhartono & Krisnadi Nasution, 2021. "The rights of the notary honoress assembly approval on notary calls in the judicial process," Technium Social Sciences Journal, Technium Science, vol. 20(1), pages 339-344, June.
    5. Ennio E. Piano, 2019. "State capacity and public choice: a critical survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 178(1), pages 289-309, January.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • P51 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems

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