Do Bad Report Cards Have Consequences? Impacts of Publicly Reported Provider Quality Information on the CABG Market in Pennsylvania
Since 1992, the Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4) has published cardiac care report cards for coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgery providers. We examine the impact of CABG report cards on a provider's aggregate volume and volume by patient severity and then employ a mixed logit model to investigate the matching between patients and providers. We find a reduction in volume of poor performing and unrated surgeons' volume but no effect on more highly rated surgeons or hospitals of any rating. We also find that the probability that patients, regardless of severity of illness, receive CABG surgery from low-performing surgeons is significantly lower.
|Date of creation:||Jul 2010|
|Publication status:||published as Wang, Justin & Hockenberry, Jason & Chou, Shin-Yi & Yang, Muzhe, 2011. "Do bad report cards have consequences? Impacts of publicly reported provider quality information on the CABG market in Pennsylvania," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 392-407, March.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.|
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