Existence d'un équilibre de Nash dans un jeu discontinu
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- Jean-Marc Bonnisseau & Pascal Gourdel & Hakim Hammami, 2005. "Existence d'un équilibre de Nash dans un jeu discontinu," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00173781, HAL.
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- Philippe Bich, 2006. "A constructive and elementary proof of Reny's theorem," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques b06001, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
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KeywordsDiscontinuous games; better-reply secure; Nash equilibrium; payoff security.;
- C69 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Other
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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