No Derivative Shareholder Suits in Europe – A Model of Percentage Limits and Collusion
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KeywordsCollusion; Derivative Shareholder Suits; Percentage Limits; Monitoring; Free Riding;
- K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-09-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2010-09-03 (Business Economics)
- NEP-EUR-2010-09-03 (Microeconomic European Issues)
- NEP-LAW-2010-09-03 (Law & Economics)
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