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Le Rôle des Permis d'Emission dans l'Exercice d'un Pouvoir de Marché sur les Marchés de gros de l'Electricité: la Stratégie de Rétention de Capacité

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  • Rousse, O.

Abstract

Lorsqu’on évoque les risques de distorsions de concurrence liés à l’introduction d’un marché de permis, on considère généralement les distorsions de concurrence provenant de la manipulation du prix de marché des permis, c’est-à-dire qu’on envisage un marché des permis non concurrentiel. Notre objectif se démarque de ces analyses par le fait qu’en prenant en compte le fonctionnement des marchés électriques, nous cherchons à comprendre comment l’introduction d’un marché de permis concurrentiel peut distordre la concurrence dans les marchés de l’électricité. Plus particulièrement, nous montrons que suivant le design du marché des permis d’émission, ces derniers peuvent avoir un rôle incitatif dans l’exercice d’un pouvoir de marché sur les marchés de gros de l’électricité par la stratégie de rétention de capacité.

Suggested Citation

  • Rousse, O., 2004. "Le Rôle des Permis d'Emission dans l'Exercice d'un Pouvoir de Marché sur les Marchés de gros de l'Electricité: la Stratégie de Rétention de Capacité," Cahiers du CREDEN (CREDEN Working Papers) 04.10.51, CREDEN (Centre de Recherche en Economie et Droit de l'Energie), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1.
  • Handle: RePEc:mop:credwp:04.10.51
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    File URL: http://www.creden.univ-montp1.fr/downloads/cahiers/CC-04-10-51.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Pierre Villa, 2009. "Equivalence entre taxation et permis d'émission échangeables," Working Papers 2009-05, CEPII research center.

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