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Corruption Perceptions: the Trap of Democratization, a Panel Data Analysis

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  • Thomas Roca

    (GED, Université Montesquieu Bordeaux IV)

  • Eda Alidedeoglu-Buchner

    (Université Paris Dauphine)

Abstract

L’indice de perception de la corruption de Transparency International (TI) est le plus célèbre des indicateurs de corruption depuis sa première publication, en 1995. Cet indicateur est également considéré comme la plus robuste des mesures de ce fléau. Cependant, puisque il s’agit précisément d’un indicateur basé sur des perceptions, il connait certaines limites. Bien que Transparency International appelle inlassablement à une utilisation plus prudente de ses indicateurs, les décideurs continuent de lui prêter un rôle d’outil d’aide à la prise de décision. Nous avions isolé, dans un article précédent, le rôle joué par les médias dans les perceptions de la corruption. Nous avions suggéré que les jeunes démocraties puissent être pénalisées par l’indicateur phare de Transparency International. En effet, nous avions montré que l’ouverture des médias conduisait à une meilleure couverture des actes de corruption, entrainant avec elle une plus forte perception de la corruption déjà existante, mais non révélée. Notre article précédent utilisait des données en coupe transversale. Dans un souci d’amélioration de la robustesse et de la précision de l’analyse précédemment menée, nous avons collecté des séries temporelles afin d’entreprendre une analyse en données de panel. Dans ce nouvel article, nous analysons le lien entre démocratie et perceptions de la corruption à la lueur d’un possible biais d’ouverture des régimes en place, biais que nous avions qualifié de « réflectif ». The Corruption Perception Index (CPI) is the most famous corruption evaluation since its first publication by Transparency International (TI), in 1995. This index is also considered the most robust measure of corruption perceptions. However, since it precisely refers to perceptions, it inevitably faces some limitations. Although Transparency International continuously advocates for a better use of its indexes, policy makers keep using the CPI as a decision making tool. In a previous article we isolated the role played by the media in corruption perceptions. We previously suggested that young democracies were penalized by Transparency International. Indeed, we showed that media aperture leads to a better coverage of corruption deeds and therefore drives a stronger perception of already existing - but not yet broadcasted - corruption. Our previous paper was using cross-section data. Pursuing more consistent evidence and robustness improvement, we collected time series to perform a panel data analysis, questioning the stability and precision of our earlier findings. In this new paper, we investigate the link between democracy and corruption perceptions, in the light of a possible opening bias, we already called “reflective bias”. (Full text in french)

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Roca & Eda Alidedeoglu-Buchner, 2010. "Corruption Perceptions: the Trap of Democratization, a Panel Data Analysis," Documents de travail 161, Groupe d'Economie du Développement de l'Université Montesquieu Bordeaux IV.
  • Handle: RePEc:mon:ceddtr:161
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    File URL: http://ged.u-bordeaux4.fr/ceddt161.pdf
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    JEL classification:

    • O11 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • O19 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations

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