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Explaining Cooperatiob and Commitment in Repeated Games

Author

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  • Fudenberg, D.

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Fudenberg, D., 1991. "Explaining Cooperatiob and Commitment in Repeated Games," Working papers 590, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:mit:worpap:590
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Vincenzo Scoppa, 2003. "Contratti incompleti ed enforcement endogeno. Una rassegna della letteratura," Economia politica, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 3, pages 391-440.
    2. D. Abreu & D. Pearce, 1999. "A Behavioral Model of Bargaining with Endogenous Types," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00s15, Economics Department, Princeton University.
    3. Cramton, Peter C. & Dees, J. Gregory, 1993. "Promoting Honesty in Negotiation: An Exercise in Practical Ethics," Business Ethics Quarterly, Cambridge University Press, vol. 3(4), pages 359-394, October.
    4. K. Schmidt, 1999. "Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games of Conflicting Interests," Levine's Working Paper Archive 626, David K. Levine.
    5. Dilip Abreu & David Pearce, 2003. "A Behavioral Model of Bargaining with Endogenous Types," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1446, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    6. David G. Pearce, 1991. "Repeated Games: Cooperation and Rationality," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 983, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    7. Lorenzo Sacconi, 2007. "A Social Contract Account for CSR as an Extended Model of Corporate Governance (II): Compliance, Reputation and Reciprocity," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 75(1), pages 77-96, September.

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    Keywords

    game theory ; economic models;

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