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Da cosa dipende la qualità delle informazioni

  • Marco GAMBARO


COMPETITION IN NEWSPAPER MARKETS, RENT SEEKING AND THE QUALITY OF INFORMATION. The availability of adequate information is one of the most important conditions for making markets and political systems work efficiently. The power of influencing, enhancing or concealing information on certain events may have relevant consequences for consumers and citizens. This paper reviews the relationships between the quality of information supplied by mass media, the competition in information and good markets, and the making of public policies. The information available to citizens/consumers can be distorted by different causes, such as the characteristics of two-sided markets, the incentives provided for people involved in the information-selection process and companies’ rent-seeking activities. Media can be captured by government through financing and regulation or by companies through public relation and promotional activities. Also excluding these strategic behaviour, the selection and production of information can be biased by specific competition dynamics in information market or in advertising marke

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano in its series Departmental Working Papers with number 2007-02.

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Date of creation: 15 Jan 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mil:wpdepa:2007-02
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