Bargaining power does not matter when sharing losses - Experimental evidence of Inequality Aversion in the Nash bargaining game
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Keywordsbargaining; losses; inequality aversion; experimental economics;
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-07-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-EVO-2012-07-23 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2012-07-23 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2012-07-23 (Game Theory)
- NEP-UPT-2012-07-23 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
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