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Supply chain coordination with information sharing in the presence of trust and trustworthiness: a behavioral model

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  • Guido Voigt

    () (Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg)

Abstract

The strategic use of private information causes efficiency losses in traditional principal-agent settings. One stream of research states that these efficiency losses cannot be overcome if all agents use their private information strategically. Yet, another stream of research highlights the importance of communication, trust and trustworthiness in supply chain management. The underlying work links the concepts of communication, trust and trustworthiness to a traditional principal-agent setting in a supply chain environment. Surprisingly, it can be shown that communication and trust can actually lead to increasing efficiency losses although there is a substantial level of trustworthiness.

Suggested Citation

  • Guido Voigt, 2009. "Supply chain coordination with information sharing in the presence of trust and trustworthiness: a behavioral model," FEMM Working Papers 09006, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
  • Handle: RePEc:mag:wpaper:09006
    as

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    File URL: http://www.ww.uni-magdeburg.de/fwwdeka/femm/a2009_Dateien/2009_06.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2009
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Abdolkarim Sadrieh & Guido Voigt, 2017. "Strategic risk in supply chain contract design," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, vol. 87(1), pages 125-153, January.
    2. Pezeshki, Yahya & Baboli, Armand & Cheikhrouhou, Naoufel & Modarres, Mohammad & Akbari Jokar, Mohammad R., 2013. "A rewarding-punishing coordination mechanism based on Trust in a divergent supply chain," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 230(3), pages 527-538.
    3. Chen Shieh-Liang & Nguyen Thi Huyen Tran & Nguyen Thi Thu Ha, 2016. "Concerns of Vietnamese Producing-exporting Seafood SMEs (VPESSMEs) on Supply Chain," International Business Research, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 9(6), pages 120-130, June.

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