The Impact of Cheap Talk on Supply Chain Performance in Case of Asymmetric Information: An Experimental Investigation
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- Pezeshki, Yahya & Baboli, Armand & Cheikhrouhou, Naoufel & Modarres, Mohammad & Akbari Jokar, Mohammad R., 2013. "A rewarding-punishing coordination mechanism based on Trust in a divergent supply chain," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 230(3), pages 527-538.
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Keywordsexperimental economics; screening contracts; supply chain coordination;
- M11 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Production Management
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
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