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Sudden Termination Auctions – An Experimental Study

Author

Listed:
  • Sascha Fuellbrunn

    (Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg)

  • Abdolkarim Sadrieh

    (Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg)

Abstract

The design of markets has become a major issue due to the capability of online operators to implement almost any set of market rules overnight. With this study we contribute to the literature of market design by presenting a theoretical and experimental analysis of sudden termination auctions. Our main focus is on the candle auction that has a positive termination probability at any time in the course of the auction. The second price candle auction which is technically demanding and rarely implemented offline proves to be a faster and equally efficient alternative to standard hard close auctions.

Suggested Citation

  • Sascha Fuellbrunn & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 2006. "Sudden Termination Auctions – An Experimental Study," FEMM Working Papers 06024, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:mag:wpaper:06024
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    File URL: https://www.fww.ovgu.de/fww_media/femm/femm_2006/2006_24.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2006
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Sascha Fuellbrunn & Tibor Neugebauer, 2007. "An experimental investigation of collusion in hard-close auctions: partners and friends," FEMM Working Papers 07024, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
    2. Sascha Fuellbrunn, 2007. "Collusion or Sniping in simultaneous ascending Auctions," FEMM Working Papers 07025, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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