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Bank Lending Technologies and SME Credit Rationing in Europe in the 2009 Crisis

Author

Listed:
  • Giovanni Ferri

    (LUMSA University)

  • Pierluigi Murro

    (LUMSA University)

  • Zeno Rotondi

    (UniCredit Bank)

Abstract

The first wave of the global financial crisis hit Europe in the last part of 2008 and through 2009. With banks in a tailspin, credit rationing intensified – as measured in various different ways – particularly for the small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). The extent of such retrenchment in the supply of credit could reflect not only the worsened general condition of the European banks but also vary at the micro level depending on the lending technologies being used in the SME-main bank rapport. Using the EFIGE database, we examine SME credit rationing in seven EU countries (Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Spain and the UK) and try to assess the extent to which differences in the lending technologies and in the status of the firm-main bank relationship contributed to the phenomenon. We find that a firm matching with a bank using the transactional lending technology was more likely to end up rationed for credit during the first part of the financial crisis.

Suggested Citation

  • Giovanni Ferri & Pierluigi Murro & Zeno Rotondi, 2016. "Bank Lending Technologies and SME Credit Rationing in Europe in the 2009 Crisis," CERBE Working Papers wpC05, CERBE Center for Relationship Banking and Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:lsa:wpaper:wpc05
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bank-Firm Relationships; Asymmetric Information; Credit Rationing.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General

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