Efficiency and Productivity Analysis in Regulation and Governance
This paper surveys the application of efficiency and productivity analysis to recent regulatory experience, especially in Europe. From a review of regulatory case studies, particularly of network industries, it is clear that regulatory practice differs from theoretical precedent in choice of methodology, sample size, model specification and price or revenue control implementation. A principal-agent model of linear regulatory contracts is used to understand this discrepancy, suggesting that efficiency and productivity analysis has been used to capture economic rent rather than to provide incentives for efficiency. Predictions of the model are used to investigate other assumptions in efficiency and productivity analysis.
|Date of creation:||Jan 2007|
|Date of revision:||Jan 2007|
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