Public Policy towards R&D in a Mixed Duopoly with Spillovers
We investigate the use of subsidies to R&D, both in a mixed and a private duopoly market. We show that the socially optimal R&D subsidy is positive and increasing in the degree of spillovers both in the private and the mixed duopoly, although it is lower for the former than for the latter. We also find support for the empirical claim that privatization is followed by a scaling down of the R&D activity. A comparative static analysis of welfare levels suggests that privatization is welfare detrimental, which lends some support to the views against the widespread adoption of privatization programs.
|Date of creation:||Jul 2006|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Loughborough, Leicestershire, LE11 3TU|
Phone: +44 (0) 1509 222701
Fax: +44 (0) 1509 223910
Web page: http://www.lboro.ac.uk/departments/sbe/research/economics/index.html
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:lbo:lbowps:2006_17. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Huw Edwards)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.