IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

The Political Economy of State Aids in the European Community : Some Econometric Evidence

  • Damien NEVEN

This paper analyses the pattern of state aids to the manufacturing sector in ten EC countries for the period 1981--90. It focuses on determinants suggested by the political economy of state aids. We estimate a regression model where the intensity of state aids is accounted for by the weakness of government, their ideological orientation, the concentration of industry, and the timing of elections. The evidence indicates that the fractionalization of political parties is associated with higher state aids. We also find support for the view that state aids are higher under right-wing governments and when firms' interests are highly concentrated. This is consistent with a partisan view of government in which firms represent an important constituency for right-wing coalitions. By contrast, the timing of elections does not seem to matter. Finally, the paper observes significant fixed country effects. We gather evidence on the transparency of procedures used to allocate and control state aids and suggest that these fixed effects could be associated with lax procedures which enhance the scope for capture.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Paper provided by Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP in its series Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) with number 9402.

as
in new window

Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: Mar 1994
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Does Europe have an Industrial Policy ?, D. Neven and L.-H. Röller (eds), Sigma, 1999
Handle: RePEc:lau:crdeep:9402
Contact details of provider: Postal: Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP, Internef, CH-1015 Lausanne
Phone: ++41 21 692.33.64
Web page: http://www.hec.unil.ch/deep/publications/cahiers/series
Email:


More information through EDIRC

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:lau:crdeep:9402. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Claudine Delapierre Saudan)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.