Debt as a Regulatory Constraint
This paper is about using specific investments and secured debt to shield a firm from exploitation by a regulatory authority. It is shown that specific investments and secured debt constrain the regulatory authority in its choice of regime, by providing a credible threat of bankruptcy.
|Date of creation:||Mar 1999|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: (+45) 35 32 30 10
Fax: +45 35 32 30 00
Web page: http://www.econ.ku.dk
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kud:kuiedp:9902. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Hoffmann)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.