The Political Economy of International Emissions Trading Scheme Choice: Empirical Evidence
The Kyoto Protocol allows international emissions trading, which could take place in three different forms: government, permit, or credit trading. Which trading system is chosen is likely to depend on the preferences of several interest groups. In this paper, we give empirical evidence on the preferences of industry and environmental organizations for national environmental policy instrument and for international emissions trading scheme. Furthermore, we present data that gives an indication about the level of rent-seeking by these groups at the international level. The aim of this paper is to identify which instruments are politically most feasible.
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