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The Political Economy of International Emissions Trading Scheme Choice: Empirical Evidence

Author

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  • Jan Tjeerd Boom

    (University of Copenhagen, Institute of Economics)

  • Gert Tinggaard Svendsen

    (Aarhus School of Business, Dept. of Economics)

Abstract

The Kyoto Protocol allows international emissions trading, which could take place in three different forms: government, permit, or credit trading. Which trading system is chosen is likely to depend on the preferences of several interest groups. In this paper, we give empirical evidence on the preferences of industry and environmental organizations for national environmental policy instrument and for international emissions trading scheme. Furthermore, we present data that gives an indication about the level of rent-seeking by these groups at the international level. The aim of this paper is to identify which instruments are politically most feasible.

Suggested Citation

  • Jan Tjeerd Boom & Gert Tinggaard Svendsen, 2000. "The Political Economy of International Emissions Trading Scheme Choice: Empirical Evidence," Discussion Papers 00-19, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0019
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    File URL: http://www.econ.ku.dk/english/research/publications/wp/2000/0019.pdf/
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    Cited by:

    1. Boom, Jan-Tjeerd, 2001. "International emissions trading under the Kyoto Protocol: : credit trading," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 29(8), pages 605-613, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Emissions Trading; CO2; Kyoto; Public Choice;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy

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